Monday, May 12, 2008

Domestic spying far outpaces terrorism prosecutions - latimes

does it occur to anybody else that maybe the threat of terrorism itself has simply been overstated? the propagandists have imbibed so much of their own kool-aid, they've forgotten that they exaggerated the severity of the threat in the first place.

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-na-justice12-2008may12,0,5742042.story?track=rss
From the Los Angeles Times

Domestic spying far outpaces terrorism prosecutions

As more Americans are watched, fewer cases are made. The trend concerns civil liberties groups as well as some lawmakers and legal experts.
By Richard B. Schmitt
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer

May 12, 2008

WASHINGTON — The number of Americans being secretly wiretapped or having their financial and other records reviewed by the government has continued to increase as officials aggressively use powers approved after the Sept. 11 attacks. But the number of terrorism prosecutions ending up in court -- one measure of the effectiveness of such sleuthing -- has continued to decline, in some cases precipitously.

The trends, visible in new government data and a private analysis of Justice Department records, are worrisome to civil liberties groups and some legal scholars. They say it is further evidence that the government has compromised the privacy rights of ordinary citizens without much to show for it.

The emphasis on spy programs also is starting to give pause to some members of Congress who fear the government is investing too much in anti-terrorism programs at the expense of traditional crime-fighting. Other lawmakers are raising questions about how well the FBI is performing its counter-terrorism mission.

The Senate Intelligence Committee last week concluded that the bureau was far behind in making internal changes to keep the nation safe from terrorist threats. Lawmakers urged that the FBI set specific benchmarks to measure its progress and make more regular reports to Congress.

These concerns come as the Bush administration has been seeking to expand its ability to gather intelligence without prior court approval. It has asked Congress for amendments to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to make it clear that eavesdropping on foreign telecommunications signals routed through the U.S. does not require a warrant.

Law enforcement officials say the additional surveillance powers have been critically important in ways the public does not always see. Threats can be mitigated, they say, by deporting suspicious people or letting them know that authorities are watching them.

"The fact that the prosecutions are down doesn't mean that the utility of these investigations is down. It suggests that these investigations may be leading to other forms of prevention and protection," said Thomas Newcomb, a former Bush White House national security aide. He said there were half a dozen actions outside of the criminal courts that the government could take to snuff out potential threats, including using diplomatic or military channels.

Although legal experts say they would not necessarily expect the number of prosecutions to rise along with the stepped-up surveillance, there are few other good ways to measure how well the government is progressing in keeping the country safe.

"How does one measure the success? The short answer is we aren't in a great position to know," said Daniel Richman, a former federal prosecutor. With prosecutions declining, he said, the public is left with imperfect and possibly misleading ways to gauge progress in the Bush administration's war on terrorism -- such as the number of secret warrants the government issues or the number of agents it assigns to terrorism cases.

"These are the only tracks in the snow left by terrorism investigations, if there are no more counter-terrorism prosecutions," Richman said. "This is why, more than ever, there is a pressing need for congressional oversight, for accountability at the top of the [Justice] department, and for public confidence in the department."

Changing numbers

A recent study showed that the number of terrorism and national security cases initiated by the Justice Department in 2007 was more than 50% below 2002 levels. The nonprofit Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, which obtained the data under the Freedom of Information Act, found that the number of cases brought declined 19% in the last year alone, dropping to 505 in 2007 from 624 in 2006.

By contrast, the Justice Department reported last month that the nation's spy court had granted 2,370 warrant requests by the department to search or eavesdrop on suspected terrorists and spies in the U.S. last year -- 9% more than in 2006. The number of such warrants approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has more than doubled since the 2001 terrorist attacks.

The department also reported a sharp rise in the use of national security letters by the FBI -- from 9,254 in 2005 to 12,583 in 2006, the latest data available. The letters seek customer information from banks, Internet providers and phone companies. They have caused a stir because consumers do not have a right to know that their information is being disclosed and the letters are issued without court oversight.

The inspector general of the Justice Department has found numerous cases in which FBI agents failed to comply with rules and guidelines in issuing the letters, often gaining access to information they were not entitled to. The FBI has responded by taking a number of measures to tighten its internal procedures.

Civil liberties groups say the new data reveal a disturbing consequence of the government's post-Sept. 11 expanded surveillance capabilities.

"The number of Americans being investigated dwarfs any legitimate number of actual terrorism prosecutions, and that is extremely troubling -- for both the security and privacy of innocent Americans as well as for the squandering of resources on people who have not and never will be charged with any wrongdoing," said Lisa Graves, deputy director of the Center for National Security Studies, a Washington-based civil liberties group.

A mixed record

But Dean Boyd, a Justice Department spokesman, said statistics on court-approved FISA applications and statistics on criminal prosecution were "apples and oranges."

"There are a variety of factors that may account for the increase in court-approved FISA applications since 9/11," he said. Boyd said he could not comment on those factors, but said, "It is important to remember that surveillance under FISA is authorized by an independent court and used carefully and judiciously to protect the country from national security threats."

Certainly, the government has pursued a number of high-profile terrorism cases of late. A U.S. sailor was convicted in March of providing support to terrorists by passing classified information regarding movements of a Navy battle group to operators of an Internet site suspected of terrorist leanings.

The record in court has been somewhat mixed, however. Federal prosecutors in Miami twice have failed to secure verdicts in the cases of six men accused of plotting to destroy Chicago's Sears Tower and several FBI offices. After two mistrials, the "Liberty City Seven" case is due in court in January.

Even some former government officials concede many intelligence investigations fail to yield evidence of a serious threat to the U.S. "Most of these threats ultimately turn out to be wrong, or maybe just the investigating makes them go away," said Washington lawyer Michael Woods, former head of the FBI national security law unit. "A lot more information is going to pass through government hands, and most of that is going to be about people who turn out to be innocent or irrelevant."

rick.schmitt@latimes.com

Thursday, May 8, 2008

toast

so this is what popped out of my toaster yesterday morning. I thought about selling it on ebay and donating the funds to help offset the 6.4 mil that hil just lent herself, but then I thought, nah - I'll just go ahead and eat it with a little butter and marmalade - mmm mmmm good!

bill moyers tells it like it is


Thursday, March 20, 2008

obama's speech - a more perfect union

obama's speech and michael meyer's response

an op-ed piece appeared in today's latimes written by former assistant national director of the NAACP michael meyers, entitled Obama Blew It. not since niall ferguson's response to harold pinter's Nobel Acceptance Speech in december 2005, have I read a more gross misrepresentation and misinterpretaion of a person's words. meyers cherry-picks the speech obama delivered, and seems to intentionally miscontrue obama's words in an apparent attempt to mislead and misinform the newspaper-reading public. I'll post my response to the article below.

dear mr meyers,

did you listen to the speech? your third paragraph that begins, "he should have..." leads me to think you missed some of it. in regard to the rest of this essay, I'm forced to wonder about the world you live in. your perception of the racial situation in america seems a combination of wishful thinking, delusion and denial. racial differences do still exist, and there are social and political and economic injustices in our country, for obama to have denied that would have been dishonest and naive - as well as simply out of touch with reality. your credit as a former national director of the naacp speaks well for your authority, but your words don't show the insight I would expect from somebody having had the experience of serving in that position.

you criticize obama for looking backward, a criticism that again makes me wonder how closely you paid attention to his speech. yes he did present the american racial divide in a historical context, to not do so would have been irresponsible - far too often our national leaders fail to look at history, resulting in the repetition of mistakes that can lead to unnecessary war or economic downturns - but although he alluded to the past he clearly stated, and I'll quote here for your benefit;

"The profound mistake of Reverend Wright's sermons is not that he spoke about racism in our society. It's that he spoke as if our society was static; as if no progress has been made; as if this country - a country that has made it possible for one of his own members to run for the highest office in the land and build a coalition of white and black; Latino and Asian, rich and poor, young and old -- is still irrevocably bound to a tragic past. But what we know -- what we have seen - is that America can change. That is the true genius of this nation. What we have already achieved gives us hope - the audacity to hope - for what we can and must achieve tomorrow.

In the white community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African-American community does not just exist in the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination - and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past - are real and must be addressed. Not just with words, but with deeds - by investing in our schools and our communities; by enforcing our civil rights laws and ensuring fairness in our criminal justice system; by providing this generation with ladders of opportunity that were unavailable for previous generations. It requires all Americans to realize that your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my dreams; that investing in the health, welfare, and education of black and brown and white children will ultimately help all of America prosper."


I don't know how much more forward thinking you want than that - and if you do, there's plenty more where that came from - that is just an excerpt I quickly grabbed from the text of the speech easily available online. you have fallen into the unfortunate trap of essayists who sometimes choose their facts to fit their thesis and ignore anything that doesn't. the danger inherent in articles like yours is that they can mislead people who haven't the time, interest, or motivation to refer directly to the original source. by misrepresenting and misinterpreting obama's words you serve as a propagandist for those who would like to see him fail, rather than a servant for truth. were your criticism accurate and fairly presented I would applaud your efforts, but having read this article i simply wonder about your personal motivation and agenda.

the facts behind the us use of the atomic bomb

yesterday morning at the coffeeshop, in regard to the comments by obama's minister - the rev jeremiah a. wright jr. - the subject of the us decision to bomb hiroshima and nagasaki came up. I was surprised to discover that two of my friends were still under the impression that the decision in 1945 was made for the sake of saving lives and bringing the war to a speedy end. they, being intelligent and reasonably well-informed people, I assumed would be up to date on the actual facts, but sadly I was mistaken. one of them referred to my explanation of the events as "a conspiracy theory" the other simply expressed his incredulity and asked why, if this information was well documented, it was not more generally known. that, I thought was a good question and he encouraged me to do what I could to spread the information. a quick google search provided me with the details and so, I sent him an email which I'll post here for the benefit of others... and as a way to fulfill my obligation to myself.

file this under "be careful what you ask for" combined with "what happens when joe finds your business card in his wallet"... or maybe just "more than you want to know about nagasaki".
the following is excerpted from a review of a book called
Why Hiroshima Was Bombed:
The 'Utopians' Duped a Nation
by William Jones
there are other sources readily available, but this is a pretty good outline the events and the decisions leading up to the atomic bomb droppings and the spinning of those events and decisions after the fact. I've excerpted passages in the hope that at least the following will be read, however more detail and documentation is available at http://new-federalist.com/other/2002/reviews/2943hiroshima.html, and of course the William Jones book itself would presumably provide an even more thorough explanation (although I haven't read it myself) if you're interested.
This information is readily available - I found it simply by googling "us reasons for bombing hiroshima" the sad truth is that it's generally unknown, I think largely because it's a painful and shameful truth that people - americans in particular - don't want to be faced with. your suggestion that I disseminate this information was a good one, because you're right - I shouldn't be frustrated at people's ignorance if I don't make some effort to correct it. so here you go, I hope you take the time to read this.
____________________

By the Spring of 1945, it was clear to all that the end of the war in the Pacific was close at hand. The successful island-hopping strategy of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, moving always for the strategic flank of the Japanese army rather than fighting for every foot of land occupied by its tenacious and fanatical soldiers, had given the greatest victory to U.S. arms with the minimum casualties, a feat perhaps unequaled in the annals of U.S. military history. Now, what terms should be presented to the Japanese to bring the Pacific war to a close?

____________________

"It was quite evident from a study of the context of the messages, that the Japanese realized further resistance was futile, and were willing to grant any concessions to halt the war, providing the Emperor remained as the spiritual head of the country," Kenney wrote.

By the Spring of 1945 these peace-feelers were coming in fast and furious. On May 7, 1945, the OSS representative in Portugal informed President Truman that the Counsellor of the Japanese Legation in Portugal had told a source that the Japanese were ready to cease hostilities provided they were allowed to retain possession of the home islands and that the terms "unconditional surrender" not be employed in the actual peace terms.

Other OSS sources working with the Vatican's Cardinal Giuseppe Montini (later Pope Paul VI), were also in touch with the Japanese, who were in the process of working out the terms of an eventual Japanese surrender—again with the proviso that the institution of the Emperor be retained.

___________________
The stated policy of the United States had been that of "unconditional surrender." This had been stated by President Roosevelt, almost fortuitously, when he met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Casablanca in January 1943. And yet, with Roosevelt, the consummate politician, there was always room for finding a way out of a dilemma if the conditions warranted it. Roosevelt did, in fact, deviate from the "unconditional surrender" formula when Italy agreed to surrender in 1944. But by May 1945, Franklin Roosevelt was dead, and his new Vice President, Harry Truman, had been sworn in as President of the United States.
(http://new-federalist.com/other/2002/reviews/2943hiroshima.html explains the political positioning behind truman having been placed into the vice presidency, and you're probably already aware of the tensions between fdr and truman - scroll down to the last paragraph in the section headed "japan prepares to surrender")
___________________
The Japanese were also aware that Russian refusal to renew the Neutrality Pact would mean that they would also have Russia to fight. The signals of a Japanese willingness to surrender then began to multiply.
__________________
The test in Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 14, 1945, produced results beyond anyone's imagination. As reports streamed back to Washington, the mood was almost ecstatic among the Utopians. Indeed, Stimson felt that the effect of the bomb was so great that he advised Truman the weapon might enable the United States to force the Soviet Union to abandon or radically alter its entire system of government.
_________________
With the successful test of the bomb, the issue now became whether to use it—and, if so, against whom? With the surrender of Nazi Germany already a fact, Japan was really the only candidate. But what if the Japanese also surrendered before the bomb was actually used in war, as all indicators were showing they intended to do? Testing the bomb in a real-time situation required, therefore, delaying such a surrender for as long as possible in order to use the bomb to end the war—and demonstrate in an unequivocal and stark, terrifying manner, the raw power now possessed by the United States.
_________________

In the light of this policy shift, the appearance of Japanese peace-feelers now became a threat that might obviate the use of the atomic bomb in war. Anything that would permit the Japanese to surrender before its use against Japan was therefore to be squelched. The envisioned entry of the Russian forces into Manchuria had therefore to be delayed for as long as possible.

Some people in Washington saw clearly what was in the works. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew, a former ambassador to Japan, caught wind of what was happening—and it frightened him. Grew renewed his efforts to quickly get a statement of intent from the United States which would guarantee a retention of the Emperor, and facilitate a rapid Japanese surrender—before the bomb could be used. More generally, Grew realized that there was a substantial peace party in Japan, and that the peace-feelers the Allied intelligence forces were picking up, were for real. The position of the United States, he felt, should be supportive of that peace party, and immediately clarifying the role of the Emperor in the peace terms was absolutely essential if peace were to be quickly achieved.

___________________

Many leading Republicans were also calling for such a statement. On July 3, the New York Times reported that the Senate Republican minority leader, Wallace White, "declared that the Pacific war might end quickly if President Truman would state, specifically, in the upper chamber, just what unconditional surrender means for the Japanese." The War Department's Operations Division advised on July 12, 1945 that "the present stand of the War Department is that Japanese surrender is just possible and is attractive enough to the U.S. to justify us in making any concession which might be attractive to the Japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the Pacific are not adversely affected."

Indeed, by this time the Japanese peace-feelers were becoming a drumbeat. On July 12, as Truman was travelling to Potsdam aboard the Presidential yacht, the Augusta, Emperor Hirohito was declaring in a meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, that although war planning had to continue, it was also "necessary to have a plan to close the war at once." A cable intercepted on July 12 from Foreign Minister Togo to Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow, and given to Truman aboard the Augusta on his way to Potsdam, stated: "We are now secretly giving consideration to the termination of the war because of the pressing situation which confronts Japan both at home and abroad." Unlike the previous peace-feelers, these were very official and very high-level, even involving the leadership of the Japanese Army, the only real hold-outs for continued fighting. By the time of the Potsdam meeting it was also known that Japan was asking Russia, with which it still had a neutrality treaty, to help it get out of the war.

______________________

But Truman, with an entirely different agenda, was not ready for peace—not yet at any rate. Indeed, arriving at Potsdam, the United States was already taking measures to delay Russian entry into the war in the Pacific.

At Yalta it had been agreed that Russia would enter the Pacific theater in exchange for several conditions: It would receive the Kurile Islands from Japan, regain control over the Chinese Far Eastern and South Manchurian railroads as well as the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and the "independence of Mongolia would be assured." In turn, Stalin agreed to sign a treaty with Nationalist China. Roosevelt had assured Stalin that he would convince Chiang Kai-shek to accept concessions to Russia in Manchuria.

The signing of an agreement between China and the Soviet Union would therefore be the immediate prelude to Soviet entry into Manchuria. With Truman's new agenda, and the successful demonstration of the atomic bomb, the brakes had to be put on the signing of such an agreement. On July 6, as he was leaving for Potsdam, Jimmy Byrnes instructed Averell Harriman, the key contact with the Soviets, to "inform both the Soviet Government and T.V. Soong [the Chinese Foreign Minister then in Moscow for negotiations with the Russians] that as a party to the Yalta Agreement we would expect to be consulted before any arrangement is concluded between the Soviet and Chinese governments."

_______________________

It was also at Potsdam that Churchill was informed of the successful test. British Chief of Staff Field Marshal Sir Alan Brookesby wrote that Churchill "was completely carried away. It was no longer necessary for the Russians to come into the Japanese war; the new explosive alone was sufficient to settle the matter. Furthermore, we now had something in our hands which would redress the balance with the Russians."

_______________________

The decision to bomb was, however, meeting with considerable resistance. The initial reaction came from those who were most in the know on the subject—the Manhattan Project scientists. A nervous Groves was keenly aware of the growing opposition among the scientists to the use of the bomb without warning. In a poll taken among 150 of the scientists working at the Manhattan Project's Chicago facility, almost half of those polled also recommended "a military demonstration" to be followed by renewed opportunity for surrender "before full use of the weapon is employed."

_______________________

More significant opposition came from the military leadership of the country, most of whom were adamantly opposed to the use of the atomic bomb. Alperovitz documents this resistance quite extensively in separate chapters dealing with the reaction from each of the uniformed services; all regarded the bombing as militarily unnecessary. Stimson himself, when in Europe for the Potsdam talks, saw fit to solicit the opinion of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Europe. "The incident took place in 1945 when Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan," Eisenhower would later write in his autobiography, Mandate for Change. "I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act.... The Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. During the recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression, and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment, I thought no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions."

Although Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Pacific theater commander, wasn't informed of the existence of the atomic bomb until five days before it was dropped on Hiroshima, he had already, in the Spring of 1945, sent his air force chief, Maj. Gen. George Kenney, to Washington to explain his view that the Japanese were close to surrender. When Kenney came to Washington and explained this to Gen. George Marshall, Marshall called in his top advisers. Kenney would report to MacArthur later that he had not succeeded in convincing them. MacArthur, until his death, insisted that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki had no military value whatsoever.

Truman's Chief of Staff, Adm. William Leahy, who chaired the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continually insisted that the Japanese were on the brink of surrender. As late as July 16, Leahy was urging the British Chief of Staff to have Churchill get Truman to modify the term "unconditional surrender." Leahy would later say, quite accurately, of the decision: "Truman told me it was agreed they would use it, after military men's statements that it would save many, many American lives, by shortening the war, only to hit military objectives. Of course, then they went ahead and killed as many women and children as they could, which was just what they wanted all the time."

Adm. Ernest King, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, was convinced that the successful blockade of Japan was bringing Japan to its knees. There was no need to invade Japan proper, King argued, because Japan was as good as defeated. This analysis would later be fully corroborated by the Strategic Bombing Survey, which in 1946 examined the destruction caused in Japan by a combination of the blockade and the incessant conventional bombing. The Survey concluded that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing, a Soviet declaration of war, or an American invasion.

________________________

On Aug. 6 at 8:16 in the morning the bomber Enola Gay dropped "Little Boy," with a yield equivalent to 12,500 tons of TNT, on the city of Hiroshima, with a population of 290,000 civilians and 43,000 soldiers. When calculations were made at the end of August, the death toll was in the realm of 100,000, but many more would die soon thereafter from the effects of the bombing. By the end of 1950, the toll had reached 200,000, with death rates calculated at 54%! On Aug. 9, "Fat Man" was dropped on Nagasaki, with 70,000 dead calculated by the end of 1945 and a total of 140,000 dead within the next five years. On hearing of the successful bombing of Hiroshima, Truman commented, "This is the greatest thing in history!" General MacArthur was dumbfounded, as MacArthur's pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary on the day after the bombing: "General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. He wants time to think the thing out, so he has postponed the trip to some future date to be decided later."

_________________________

More significant, perhaps, than the arduous plodding through the files to get a clear step-by-step picture of the events leading up to the decision, are the revelations by the Alperovitz team of the growing U.S. domestic reaction to the bombing and the frantic efforts by the perpetrators to cover their tracks—a story which has received very little publicity.

Reports of the terrible facts and consequences of the atomic bombings—most especially, author John Hersey's "Hiroshima," which filled the August 1946 issue of The New Yorker magazine and sold hundreds of thousands of copies—had a strong impact on the American public. A steady stream of criticism of the bombing came from key religious leaders in the United States. The effect of what James Conant derided as "this type of sentimentalism" moved Conant—now president of Harvard—to ask his friend Harvey Bundy to get Stimson to counterattack. Conant agreed with Bertrand Russell that the demonstration of the atomic bomb in a war situation had been essential to force the world into a control regime. But the American citizen had to be "convinced" by a counter-story on Japan.

At the time Stimson was working on his memoirs, being assisted by Harvey Bundy's son, McGeorge Bundy. The two now readily undertook the task of providing the "cover-up" for the atom bomb decision. McGeorge Bundy would write a draft for Stimson's perusal and signature. After his discussions with Conant, Harvey Bundy himself had drafted a number of "pointers" that he felt should be included in such an article: namely, that the bomb decision was primarily ordered with the thought that it would save American lives; that no major person in authority thought that Japan would surrender on terms acceptable to the Allies; that the Interim Committee had rejected targets "where the destruction of life and property would be the very greatest"; that the committee had discussed "intensively" whether the bomb should be used at all; and that the committee had also considered the possibility of a demonstration prior to its use in war. In particular he wanted to downplay any inference that the bomb played any role in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

With "old Bundy's" notes in hand, "young Bundy"—who later, as National Security Adviser to Kennedy and Johnson, would help to maneuver these Presidents into the jungles of Vietnam—went to work on the draft. Various people, including Groves, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and Bernard Baruch, who would shortly present Truman's first draconian nuclear control plan to the United Nations, had their say in the draft. Groves underlined the basic lie of the piece: that the dropping of the bomb shortened the war by months and saved many human lives which the planned invasion of Japan would have exacted.

Conant himself wanted to make the point that, given the tremendous destruction of the conventional bombing of Japan, the atom bomb was just like any other bomb, only a bit more destructive. Tellingly, Conant urged Bundy to drop all reference to the issue of the Emperor in the paper.

In the final draft, Bundy so exaggerated the figures that it stated twice that the dropping of the bomb had saved over a million lives. And yet, the best estimates given to General Marshall of the possible casualty rates of American forces in a full-scale invasion, were always in the range of 40,000 to 46,000. The big lie just kept getting bigger.

The essay was published in the February 1947 issue of Harper's magazine. Breaking all precedent as regards copyright, Harper's gave permission for anyone who wanted to reproduce the article to do so. It was therefore quickly reprinted in the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the Omaha World Herald, Reader's Digest, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and many other papers. McGeorge Bundy quipped to Stimson, "The Harper's article has been read by everyone I meet, and it seems to have covered the subject so well that I find no follow-up work needed.... I think we deserve some sort of medal for reducing these particular chatterers to silence."

Not everyone felt that the effect was sufficient, however. Conant had Karl Compton, the president of MIT, launch a parallel defense of the bombing in the Atlantic Monthly, upping the ante in terms of the outrageous claims of the number of lives saved. "I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands—perhaps several millions—of lives, both American and Japanese," Compton wrote. This was, for them, not merely an attempt to justify their actions. "If the propaganda against the use of the atomic bomb had been allowed to grow unchecked," Conant wrote Stimson, "the strength of our military position by virtue of having the bomb would have been correspondingly weakened, and with the weakening would have come a decrease in the probabilities of an international agreement for the control of atomic energy." Indeed this, and not the defeat of Japan, had been the real Wellsian purpose of the bomb project to begin with.

Wednesday, March 12, 2008

members of congress who voted against overriding the president's veto of H.R. 2082

today's fear monger award is shared by the 188 members of congress who voted against overriding the president's veto of the bill that would place a ban on waterboarding and other harsh interrogation techniques. the "nay" votes are the ones who favor the use of waterboarding by american intelligence officers. all I can ask is, "what has our countery become?" but while I pose the question, I think we all know the answer, although it's painful to face it.


I would like to also express my thanks to the members of congress who voted "yea". thanks for trying, although I wish you could have somehow swayed more opposing members.


the following list of votes is from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2008-117

Please note that there is a slight glitch in this voting record. GovTrack could not identify all of the voters from the original source data. Some voters are listed as 'Unknown Person', and the Party Breakdown table may be inaccurate.

Vote to overrride presidential veto of H.R. 2082: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 - March 11th, 2008

Votes

Vote DistrictRepresentative

Alabama

NayAL-1Bonner, Jo [R]
NayAL-2Everett, Terry [R]
NayAL-3Rogers, Michael [R]
NayAL-4Aderholt, Robert [R]
AyeAL-5Cramer, Robert [D]
NayAL-6Bachus, Spencer [R]
AyeAL-7Davis, Artur [D]

Alaska

NayAK-0Young, Donald [R]

Arizona

NayAZ-1Renzi, Rick [R]
NayAZ-2Franks, Trent [R]
NayAZ-3Shadegg, John [R]
AyeAZ-4Pastor, Edward [D]
No VoteAZ-5Mitchell, Harry [D]
NayAZ-6Flake, Jeff [R]
AyeAZ-7Grijalva, Raul [D]
AyeAZ-8Giffords, Gabrielle [D]

Arkansas

AyeAR-1Berry, Robert [D]
AyeAR-2Snyder, Victor [D]
NayAR-3Boozman, John [R]
AyeAR-4Ross, Mike [D]

California

AyeCA-1Thompson, C. [D]
NayCA-2Herger, Walter [R]
NayCA-3Lungren, Daniel [R]
NayCA-4Doolittle, John [R]
AyeCA-5Matsui, Doris [D]
No VoteCA-6Woolsey, Lynn [D]
AyeCA-7Miller, George [D]
AyeCA-8Pelosi, Nancy [D]
AyeCA-9Lee, Barbara [D]
AyeCA-10Tauscher, Ellen [D]
AyeCA-11McNerney, Jerry [D]
AyeCA-13Stark, Fortney [D]
AyeCA-14Eshoo, Anna [D]
AyeCA-15Honda, Michael [D]
AyeCA-16Lofgren, Zoe [D]
AyeCA-17Farr, Sam [D]
AyeCA-18Cardoza, Dennis [D]
No VoteCA-19Radanovich, George [R]
AyeCA-20Costa, Jim [D]
NayCA-21Nunes, Devin [R]
NayCA-22McCarthy, Kevin [R]
AyeCA-23Capps, Lois [D]
NayCA-24Gallegly, Elton [R]
NayCA-25McKeon, Howard [R]
NayCA-26Dreier, David [R]
AyeCA-27Sherman, Brad [D]
AyeCA-28Berman, Howard [D]
AyeCA-29Schiff, Adam [D]
AyeCA-30Waxman, Henry [D]
AyeCA-31Becerra, Xavier [D]
AyeCA-32Solis, Hilda [D]
AyeCA-33Watson, Diane [D]
AyeCA-34Roybal-Allard, Lucille [D]
NayCA-35Waters, Maxine [D]
AyeCA-36Harman, Jane [D]
AyeCA-37Richardson, Laura [D]
AyeCA-38Napolitano, Grace [D]
AyeCA-39Sanchez, Linda [D]
NayCA-40Royce, Edward [R]
NayCA-41Lewis, Jerry [R]
NayCA-42Miller, Gary [R]
AyeCA-43Baca, Joe [D]
NayCA-44Calvert, Ken [R]
NayCA-45Bono Mack, Mary [R]
NayCA-46Rohrabacher, Dana [R]
AyeCA-47Sanchez, Loretta [D]
NayCA-48Campbell, John [R]
NayCA-49Issa, Darrell [R]
NayCA-50Bilbray, Brian [R]
AyeCA-51Filner, Bob [D]
NayCA-52Hunter, Duncan [R]
AyeCA-53Davis, Susan [D]

Colorado

AyeCO-1DeGette, Diana [D]
AyeCO-2Udall, Mark [D]
AyeCO-3Salazar, John [D]
NayCO-4Musgrave, Marilyn [R]
NayCO-5Lamborn, Doug [R]
No VoteCO-6Tancredo, Thomas [R]
AyeCO-7Perlmutter, Ed [D]

Connecticut

AyeCT-1Larson, John [D]
AyeCT-2Courtney, Joe [D]
AyeCT-3DeLauro, Rosa [D]
NayCT-4Shays, Christopher [R]
AyeCT-5Murphy, Christopher [D]

Delaware

NayDE-0Castle, Michael [R]

Florida

NayFL-1Miller, Jeff [R]
AyeFL-2Boyd, F. [D]
AyeFL-3Brown, Corrine [D]
NayFL-4Crenshaw, Ander [R]
NayFL-5Brown-Waite, Virginia [R]
NayFL-6Stearns, Clifford [R]
NayFL-7Mica, John [R]
NayFL-8Keller, Ric [R]
NayFL-9Bilirakis, Gus [R]
NayFL-10Young, C. W. [R]
AyeFL-11Castor, Kathy [D]
NayFL-12Putnam, Adam [R]
NayFL-13Buchanan, Vern [R]
NayFL-14Mack, Connie [R]
NayFL-15Weldon, David [R]
AyeFL-16Mahoney, Tim [D]
AyeFL-17Meek, Kendrick [D]
No VoteFL-18Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana [R]
AyeFL-19Wexler, Robert [D]
AyeFL-20Wasserman Schultz, Debbie [D]
NayFL-21Diaz-Balart, Lincoln [R]
AyeFL-22Klein, Ron [D]
AyeFL-23Hastings, Alcee [D]
NayFL-24Feeney, Tom [R]
NayFL-25Diaz-Balart, Mario [R]

Georgia

NayGA-1Kingston, Jack [R]
AyeGA-2Bishop, Sanford [D]
NayGA-3Westmoreland, Lynn [R]
AyeGA-4Johnson, Henry [D]
AyeGA-5Lewis, John [D]
NayGA-6Price, Tom [R]
NayGA-7Linder, John [R]
NayGA-8Marshall, James [D]
NayGA-9Deal, Nathan [R]
NayGA-10Broun, Paul [R]
NayGA-11Gingrey, John [R]
AyeGA-12Barrow, John [D]
AyeGA-13Scott, David [D]

Hawaii

AyeHI-1Abercrombie, Neil [D]
AyeHI-2Hirono, Mazie [D]

Idaho

NayID-1Sali, Bill [R]
NayID-2Simpson, Michael [R]

Illinois

No VoteIL-1Rush, Bobby [D]
AyeIL-2Jackson, Jesse [D]
AyeIL-3Lipinski, Daniel [D]
AyeIL-4Gutierrez, Luis [D]
AyeIL-5Emanuel, Rahm [D]
NayIL-6Roskam, Peter [R]
AyeIL-7Davis, Danny [D]
AyeIL-8Bean, Melissa [D]
AyeIL-9Schakowsky, Janice [D]
NayIL-10Kirk, Mark [R]
NayIL-11Weller, Gerald [R]
AyeIL-12Costello, Jerry [D]
NayIL-13Biggert, Judy [R]
AyeIL-15Johnson, Timothy [R]
NayIL-16Manzullo, Donald [R]
AyeIL-17Hare, Phil [D]
NayIL-18LaHood, Ray [R]
NayIL-19Shimkus, John [R]

Indiana

AyeIN-1Visclosky, Peter [D]
AyeIN-2Donnelly, Joe [D]
NayIN-3Souder, Mark [R]
NayIN-4Buyer, Stephen [R]
NayIN-5Burton, Dan [R]
NayIN-6Pence, Mike [R]
AyeIN-8Ellsworth, Brad [D]
AyeIN-9Hill, Baron [D]

Iowa

AyeIA-1Braley, Bruce [D]
AyeIA-2Loebsack, David [D]
AyeIA-3Boswell, Leonard [D]
NayIA-4Latham, Thomas [R]
NayIA-5King, Steve [R]

Kansas

NayKS-1Moran, Jerry [R]
AyeKS-2Boyda, Nancy [D]
AyeKS-3Moore, Dennis [D]
NayKS-4Tiahrt, Todd [R]

Kentucky

NayKY-1Whitfield, Edward [R]
NayKY-2Lewis, Ron [R]
AyeKY-3Yarmuth, John [D]
No VoteKY-4Davis, Geoff [R]
NayKY-5Rogers, Harold [R]
AyeKY-6Chandler, Ben [D]

Louisiana

AyeLA-2Jefferson, William [D]
AyeLA-3Melancon, Charles [D]
NayLA-4McCrery, James [R]
NayLA-5Alexander, Rodney [R]
NayLA-7Boustany, Charles [R]

Maine

AyeME-1Allen, Thomas [D]
AyeME-2Michaud, Michael [D]

Maryland

AyeMD-1Gilchrest, Wayne [R]
AyeMD-2Ruppersberger, C.A. [D]
AyeMD-3Sarbanes, John [D]
AyeMD-4Wynn, Albert [D]
AyeMD-5Hoyer, Steny [D]
AyeMD-6Bartlett, Roscoe [R]
AyeMD-7Cummings, Elijah [D]
AyeMD-8Van Hollen, Christopher [D]

Massachusetts

AyeMA-1Olver, John [D]
AyeMA-2Neal, Richard [D]
AyeMA-3McGovern, James [D]
AyeMA-4Frank, Barney [D]
AyeMA-5Tsongas, Niki [D]
AyeMA-6Tierney, John [D]
AyeMA-7Markey, Edward [D]
AyeMA-8Capuano, Michael [D]
AyeMA-9Lynch, Stephen [D]
AyeMA-10Delahunt, William [D]

Michigan

AyeMI-1Stupak, Bart [D]
NayMI-2Hoekstra, Peter [R]
NayMI-3Ehlers, Vernon [R]
NayMI-4Camp, David [R]
AyeMI-5Kildee, Dale [D]
NayMI-6Upton, Frederick [R]
NayMI-7Walberg, Timothy [R]
NayMI-8Rogers, Michael [R]
NayMI-9Knollenberg, Joseph [R]
NayMI-10Miller, Candice [R]
NayMI-11McCotter, Thaddeus [R]
AyeMI-12Levin, Sander [D]
No VoteMI-13Kilpatrick, Carolyn [D]
AyeMI-14Conyers, John [D]
AyeMI-15Dingell, John [D]

Minnesota

AyeMN-1Walz, Timothy [D]
NayMN-2Kline, John [R]
NayMN-3Ramstad, James [R]
AyeMN-4McCollum, Betty [D]
AyeMN-5Ellison, Keith [D]
NayMN-6Bachmann, Michele [R]
AyeMN-7Peterson, Collin [D]
No VoteMN-8Oberstar, James [D]

Mississippi

No VoteMS-2Thompson, Bennie [D]
NayMS-3Pickering, Charles [R]
AyeMS-4Taylor, Gene [D]

Missouri

AyeMO-1Clay, William [D]
NayMO-2Akin, W. [R]
AyeMO-3Carnahan, Russ [D]
AyeMO-4Skelton, Ike [D]
AyeMO-5Cleaver, Emanuel [D]
NayMO-6Graves, Samuel [R]
NayMO-7Blunt, Roy [R]
NayMO-8Emerson, Jo Ann [R]
NayMO-9Hulshof, Kenny [R]

Montana

NayMT-0Rehberg, Dennis [R]

Nebraska

NayNE-1Fortenberry, Jeffrey [R]
NayNE-2Terry, Lee [R]
NayNE-3Smith, Adrian [R]

Nevada

AyeNV-1Berkley, Shelley [D]
NayNV-2Heller, Dean [R]
NayNV-3Porter, Jon [R]

New Hampshire

AyeNH-1Shea-Porter, Carol [D]
AyeNH-2Hodes, Paul [D]

New Jersey

AyeNJ-1Andrews, Robert [D]
NayNJ-2LoBiondo, Frank [R]
NayNJ-3Saxton, H. [R]
AyeNJ-4Smith, Christopher [R]
NayNJ-5Garrett, E. [R]
AyeNJ-6Pallone, Frank [D]
NayNJ-7Ferguson, Michael [R]
AyeNJ-8Pascrell, William [D]
AyeNJ-9Rothman, Steven [D]
AyeNJ-10Payne, Donald [D]
NayNJ-11Frelinghuysen, Rodney [R]
AyeNJ-12Holt, Rush [D]
AyeNJ-13Sires, Albio [D]

New Mexico

NayNM-1Wilson, Heather [R]
NayNM-2Pearce, Steven [R]
AyeNM-3Udall, Tom [D]

New York

AyeNY-1Bishop, Timothy [D]
AyeNY-2Israel, Steve [D]
NayNY-3King, Peter [R]
AyeNY-4McCarthy, Carolyn [D]
AyeNY-5Ackerman, Gary [D]
AyeNY-6Meeks, Gregory [D]
AyeNY-7Crowley, Joseph [D]
AyeNY-8Nadler, Jerrold [D]
AyeNY-9Weiner, Anthony [D]
AyeNY-10Towns, Edolphus [D]
AyeNY-11Clarke, Yvette [D]
AyeNY-12Velazquez, Nydia [D]
NayNY-13Fossella, Vito [R]
AyeNY-14Maloney, Carolyn [D]
No VoteNY-15Rangel, Charles [D]
AyeNY-16Serrano, José [D]
AyeNY-17Engel, Eliot [D]
AyeNY-18Lowey, Nita [D]
AyeNY-19Hall, John [D]
AyeNY-20Gillibrand, Kirsten [D]
AyeNY-21McNulty, Michael [D]
AyeNY-22Hinchey, Maurice [D]
NayNY-23McHugh, John [R]
AyeNY-24Arcuri, Michael [D]
NayNY-25Walsh, James [R]
NayNY-26Reynolds, Thomas [R]
AyeNY-27Higgins, Brian [D]
AyeNY-28Slaughter, Louise [D]
NayNY-29Kuhl, John [R]

North Carolina

AyeNC-1Butterfield, George [D]
AyeNC-2Etheridge, Bob [D]
NayNC-3Jones, Walter [R]
AyeNC-4Price, David [D]
NayNC-5Foxx, Virginia [R]
No VoteNC-6Coble, Howard [R]
AyeNC-7McIntyre, Mike [D]
NayNC-8Hayes, Robin [R]
NayNC-9Myrick, Sue [R]
NayNC-10Mchenry, Patrick [R]
AyeNC-11Shuler, Heath [D]
AyeNC-12Watt, Melvin [D]
AyeNC-13Miller, R. [D]

North Dakota

AyeND-0Pomeroy, Earl [D]

Ohio

NayOH-1Chabot, Steven [R]
NayOH-2Schmidt, Jean [R]
NayOH-3Turner, Michael [R]
NayOH-4Jordan, Jim [R]
NayOH-5Latta, Robert [R]
AyeOH-6Wilson, Charles [D]
NayOH-7Hobson, David [R]
NayOH-8Boehner, John [R]
AyeOH-9Kaptur, Marcy [D]
NayOH-10Kucinich, Dennis [D]
AyeOH-11Jones, Stephanie [D]
NayOH-12Tiberi, Patrick [R]
AyeOH-13Sutton, Betty [D]
NayOH-14LaTourette, Steven [R]
No VoteOH-15Pryce, Deborah [R]
NayOH-16Regula, Ralph [R]
AyeOH-17Ryan, Timothy [D]
AyeOH-18Space, Zackary [D]

Oklahoma

NayOK-1Sullivan, John [R]
AyeOK-2Boren, Dan [D]
NayOK-3Lucas, Frank [R]
NayOK-4Cole, Tom [R]
NayOK-5Fallin, Mary [R]

Oregon

AyeOR-1Wu, David [D]
NayOR-2Walden, Greg [R]
AyeOR-3Blumenauer, Earl [D]
AyeOR-4DeFazio, Peter [D]
No VoteOR-5Hooley, Darlene [D]

Pennsylvania

AyePA-1Brady, Robert [D]
AyePA-2Fattah, Chaka [D]
NayPA-3English, Philip [R]
AyePA-4Altmire, Jason [D]
NayPA-5Peterson, John [R]
NayPA-6Gerlach, Jim [R]
AyePA-7Sestak, Joe [D]
AyePA-8Murphy, Patrick [D]
NayPA-9Shuster, William [R]
AyePA-10Carney, Christopher [D]
AyePA-11Kanjorski, Paul [D]
AyePA-12Murtha, John [D]
No VotePA-13Schwartz, Allyson [D]
AyePA-14Doyle, Michael [D]
No VotePA-15Dent, Charles [R]
NayPA-16Pitts, Joseph [R]
AyePA-17Holden, Tim [D]
NayPA-18Murphy, Tim [R]
NayPA-19Platts, Todd [R]

Rhode Island

AyeRI-1Kennedy, Patrick [D]
AyeRI-2Langevin, James [D]

South Carolina

NaySC-1Brown, Henry [R]
NaySC-2Wilson, Addison [R]
NaySC-3Barrett, James [R]
NaySC-4Inglis, Bob [R]
AyeSC-5Spratt, John [D]
AyeSC-6Clyburn, James [D]

South Dakota

AyeSD-0Herseth Sandlin, Stephanie [D]

Tennessee

NayTN-1Davis, David [R]
NayTN-2Duncan, John [R]
NayTN-3Wamp, Zach [R]
AyeTN-4Davis, Lincoln [D]
AyeTN-5Cooper, Jim [D]
AyeTN-6Gordon, Barton [D]
NayTN-7Blackburn, Marsha [R]
AyeTN-8Tanner, John [D]
AyeTN-9Cohen, Steve [D]

Texas

NayTX-1Gohmert, Louis [R]
NayTX-2Poe, Ted [R]
NayTX-3Johnson, Samuel [R]
NayTX-4Hall, Ralph [R]
NayTX-5Hensarling, Jeb [R]
NayTX-6Barton, Joe [R]
NayTX-7Culberson, John [R]
NayTX-8Brady, Kevin [R]
AyeTX-9Green, Al [D]
NayTX-10McCaul, Michael [R]
NayTX-11Conaway, K. [R]
NayTX-12Granger, Kay [R]
NayTX-13Thornberry, William [R]
AyeTX-14Paul, Ronald [R]
AyeTX-15Hinojosa, Rubén [D]
AyeTX-16Reyes, Silvestre [D]
AyeTX-17Edwards, Thomas [D]
AyeTX-18Jackson-Lee, Sheila [D]
NayTX-19Neugebauer, Randy [R]
AyeTX-20Gonzalez, Charles [D]
NayTX-21Smith, Lamar [R]
AyeTX-22Lampson, Nicholas [D]
AyeTX-23Rodriguez, Ciro [D]
NayTX-24Marchant, Kenny [R]
AyeTX-25Doggett, Lloyd [D]
NayTX-26Burgess, Michael [R]
AyeTX-27Ortiz, Solomon [D]
AyeTX-28Cuellar, Henry [D]
AyeTX-29Green, Raymond [D]
AyeTX-30Johnson, Eddie [D]
NayTX-31Carter, John [R]
NayTX-32Sessions, Peter [R]

Utah

NayUT-1Bishop, Rob [R]
AyeUT-2Matheson, Jim [D]
NayUT-3Cannon, Christopher [R]

Vermont

AyeVT-0Welch, Peter [D]

Virginia

NayVA-1Wittman, Robert [R]
NayVA-2Drake, Thelma [R]
AyeVA-3Scott, Robert [D]
NayVA-4Forbes, James [R]
NayVA-5Goode, Virgil [R]
NayVA-6Goodlatte, Robert [R]
NayVA-7Cantor, Eric [R]
AyeVA-8Moran, James [D]
AyeVA-9Boucher, Frederick [D]
NayVA-10Wolf, Frank [R]
NayVA-11Davis, Thomas [R]

Washington

AyeWA-1Inslee, Jay [D]
AyeWA-2Larsen, Rick [D]
AyeWA-3Baird, Brian [D]
NayWA-4Hastings, Doc [R]
NayWA-5McMorris Rodgers, Cathy [R]
AyeWA-6Dicks, Norman [D]
AyeWA-7McDermott, James [D]
NayWA-8Reichert, Dave [R]
AyeWA-9Smith, Adam [D]

West Virginia

AyeWV-1Mollohan, Alan [D]
No VoteWV-2Capito, Shelley [R]
AyeWV-3Rahall, Nick [D]

Wisconsin

NayWI-1Ryan, Paul [R]
AyeWI-2Baldwin, Tammy [D]
AyeWI-3Kind, Ronald [D]
AyeWI-4Moore, Gwen [D]
NayWI-5Sensenbrenner, F. [R]
NayWI-6Petri, Thomas [R]
AyeWI-7Obey, David [D]
AyeWI-8Kagen, Steve [D]

Wyoming

NayWY-0Cubin, Barbara [R]